In an article published in the JRSM, Volume 99, Ferner and McDowell adopted a literature review of doctors charged with manslaughter since 1795. From a reading of their article it is possible to determine that they arrived at the following conclusions. First, that there had been a significant increase in the prosecution of doctors for gross negligence manslaughter since 1990; second, that the majority of these doctors should not have been prosecuted; third, that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has failed to abide by its own prosecution Code; and fourth, that we have charged doctors as 'an emotionally satisfying way to exact retribution . . . ' We question the methodology, analysis and conclusions reached by the authors. They relied for the most part on newspaper reports, a notoriously unreliable source, for an accurate account of the allegations. In every case all the evidence is considered by experienced doctors before any prosecution is commenced.
We apply the criminal law on gross negligence manslaughter as we are required to do, yet Ferner and McDowell criticise us for not using the criteria of 'mistakes, slips (or lapses) and violations', tests that are unknown to the criminal law.
Ferner and McDowell have failed to understand the CPS 'realistic prospect of conviction' test and have applied a simplistic numerical test against all the cases they could identify. The test is whether in this particular case there is a realistic prospect of conviction, not whether half of all defendants are convicted.
The suggestion that, by charging doctors with manslaughter, the CPS is somehow seeking some emotional satisfaction in retribution is self-evidently bizarre and entirely unsupported by any evidence. 
Authors' reply
Mr O'Doherty glosses over our most obvious finding: more and more doctors are being prosecuted for gross negligence manslaughter. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) cannot confirm or refute this, because they do not keep relevant statistics. We hope this will change.
Mr O'Doherty criticizes us for using the published evidence to classify the aetiology of acts that have led to manslaughter charges. We recognized the difficulties with this approach in our article. We maintain that a doctor who makes a slip of the sort that is inevitable in human actions should not be judged criminally negligent, whatever dire consequences there are for the patient. This is consistent with the legal test that the CPS must of course apply, that the error was so bad that no reasonable doctor of the same level of experience, in the same situation, would have made that error.
The Code of the CPS requires that, for a case to be brought, the jury should be more likely than not to convict. 1 The outcome of any individual case is binary: 'convicted' or 'acquitted.' Laws of statistics apply even to lawyers. If the probability of conviction were exactly 0.5, then there would be just a 5% chance of the observed 14 convictions in 39 cases brought since the CPS and their colleagues in Northern Ireland were set up. 2 The CPS can take no comfort from the fact that nearly a quarter of recent cases were abandoned before trial or dismissed by the judge.
We impute no emotional motives to the CPS in our article. We do contrast society's desire for retributive justice with the desire to reduce deaths from errors. This is crucial. Society has to choose whether to exact retribution, or to minimize harm. All those involved need to realize that the two goals are inconsistent.
